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Abstract
America has enjoyed more than a half century as a superpower, much of which as the lone world superpower. For better or worse, this position has been underpinned by its technological superiority and ability to deter significant challenge.
In recent years, (potential) adversaries have eroded America's technological advantage through massive investment, while at the same time U.S. research and development (R&D) budgets have been shrinking. The necessity to maintain technological supremacy despite fiscal constraints requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to re-examine its policy and practices towards R&D. America can no longer afford to throw massive amounts of money at innovation, especially without some assurance of return on investment.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has, since its inception, made a science out of innovation and advancing the state-of-the-art.
The DOD as a whole would greatly benefit from studying DARPA's best practices and motis operendai.
vi Preface American warfare is often described in terms of weapons, systems and tactics, many of which are unique to the United States. Too often, however, the industry and methods that produce military technology and enable the American way-of-war are overshadowed by the materiel they produce. As I learned more about what the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) does and how it does it, it became apparent that the defense industry itself is a weapon system that must be cultivated, and that DARPA's approach to doing so ensures the greatest potential for meaningful success. -Mark Twain Duels are foolish. Mark Twain's approach to conflict resolution is much preferable to squaring off against an opponent with an equal arsenal and will to prevail. At best one guy gets out alive, but more likely both are bleeding from the belly. America has seen its fair share of pistol duels whether in open conflict, cold wars, or drawn out asymmetric fights. It's far better to avoid duels in the first place by not wooing the same maiden as your rival, but the fact of the matter is, there aren't that many pretty girls in the village.
The United States has four options when it comes to securing its future.
One, stop wooing the pretty girls (oil, international influence, global trade, etc Arguably, it was the heavy industry itself that was the critical weapon system, not the weapons themselves. US planes were superior to German planes only in number and reserve 2 . Additionally, when faced with more heavily armored German Panther tanks, the US Army employed a tactic that involved overwhelming them with a superior number of inferior M-4 tanks.
Figure 1: US vs German Tank Production and Tactical Impact 3
At first this sounds like a victory won with superior tactics, but those tactics were only enabled by availability of many more US tanks. The US industrial base was inarguably superior to that of the Germans. and China. It is far more expensive to project power across an ocean than a straight. Furthermore, the Chinese are far more cost effective in their efforts, investing in anti-ship missiles that can negate entire carrier strike groups, and mobile integrated air defense networks that diminish the effectiveness of costly US stealthy air assets. Relative technological parity has enabled the Chinese to deny the US access to certain domains for a fraction of the cost. American military supremacy through technological superiority has ceased to be a deterrent, and the closing technology gap threatens either an arms race or loss of US influence in the region. The DOD can ill afford a costly arms race; the technology gap must be reopened, and innovation is the key.
Research & Development Further Threatened
The recent down trend in US Research and Development (R&D) investment is troubling, when compared with growth of near peer competitors.
The FY 2012 Science and Technology (S&T) funding will take a proposed 11.8%
cut, reversing the upward trend of increased investment peaking between 2005-7 15 . Contrast that with a steady increase in R&D investment in Asia.
Between 1995 Transition gaps are a fact of life that must be dealt with to maintain the US technological edge.
If the security of the United States is underpinned by technological superiority, and by virtue, R&D and S&T, US investment cannot be allowed to wane. The inconvenient truth is that the US can no longer afford to invest what it needs to, and cannot afford not to. DARPA tackles these challenges head on, filling transition gaps and fostering US technological development. The social art of warfare is to mold your adversary's perception about the attainability of his goals through the application of real force or the threat thereof. A superpower is one whose opponents believe that there is no reasonable expectation of achieving their goals in a challenge. The strongest of wills can be changed by these means when even death will not; killing an enemy may not change his mind, but killing his aspirations will. The Japanese were (arguably) prepared to fight to the death to defend the homeland, but the atomic bomb made defense futile. Persuading the Japanese that their goals were unachievable was made possible by the technological advantage provided by atomic weapons. What is the next nuclear bomb or stealth technology that compels an adversary not to fight?
The American way-of-war has relied on technological superiority, but incremental advances in existing technologies will only feed arms races with near peers. Likening conflict to a busy highway, stealth technology and atomic weapons allowed America to change lanes to avoid the on-coming traffic, instead of simply bearing down to absorb the impact. America must once again change lanes, rendering adversary military options and investments obsolete, deterring challenges in the first place. The major technological challenge that faces America in the future is developing that technology which will maintain American supremacy.
To maintain the technological supremacy that underpins its security America must do the following:
• Develop lane-changing defense technology to render adversary investments obsolete (thus deterring the will to challenge the US)
• Cultivate the supporting industries for its exclusive use, while reducing the cost of development
• Remain relevant in a changing defense environment
There is no guarantee of discovering a breakthrough technology, but there are best practices that have been used successfully so far. the-art, it is not considered a "DARPA-hard" problem. DARPA reserves its money for revolutionary change, not incremental. Thus the state-of-the-art is constantly stressed and advanced; a specific DARPA program may never see the field, but the technology developed to meet its lofty goals often does.
Setting high, sometimes very high goals is the only way to achieve great feats.
Many DARPA programs fail. Many more than might be expected, but those that succeed far overshadow the failures along the way. 
Cultivating Industry and Reducing Cost the DARPA way
This paper contends that the defense industry itself is a weapon system or at least is a strategic core competency of the department of defense. DARPA does as well. The agency advances the industrial state-of-the-art and feeds it back into the acquisition machine. It does this in a number of ways: cost sharing, constructive contracting, seedling efforts (small investments) to name a few.
Acquisition contracts are very rigid and single purposed, they need to be.
They are designed to acquire a thing for the government, and that thing is rigorously defined in a requirements document. The interests of the government who needs the thing can be at odds with the contractor providing it. Deviation from the contract is discouraged and at times illegal. When dealing with the cutting edge of technology, it is ill advised to deal in hard requirements. The DARPA standard 10x improvement may not be achievable, but 8x may be. The initial objective may prove irrelevant, but pursuing it may reveal an equally beneficial alternative.
One of the unique strengths of DARPA is its ability to cut contracts that benefit both the government and industry. DARPA's relatively flat organizational structure (PMs have only an office director between themselves and the agency director) and access to a team of highly experienced contracting officers, enables a timely and efficient process of getting performers (contractors performing the work) on contract. Also, being an R&D organization, DARPA 
Remaining Relevant the DARPA way
The 'D' in DARPA is for defense, a subtle but critical guiding principle.
Maintaining relevance to the warfighter is how DARPA ensures that it is cultivating the American defense industry weapon system, and not just creating video games and gravity boots. DARPA ensures relevance systematically through a number of processes that maintain focus on the everchanging defense landscape. In order for a 'good idea' to become a DARPA program, it must fit into one of the analytic frameworks. Furthermore, the frameworks are periodically reassessed and matured. DARPA programs are in turn periodically reassessed against their parent framework to ensure that they are remaining relevant.
Program objectives have been known to change, been re-scoped, or eliminated.
In a recent case, the Energy framework was abandoned altogether due to budget cuts and overlap with ARPA-E efforts (Advanced Research Projects Agency -Energy). In doing so, all programs that fell under the Energy framework were discontinued. Rather than being a draconian measure, the cuts were strategically justified, aligned with evolving fiscal realities and agency posture, and focused specifically on the programs that no longer served the agency's greater purpose. Stewardship of public resources requires sound decision making and organizational courage to follow through on tough choices. The analytic framework structure ensures that sound decision making is baked into the process from the beginning, achieving unity of effort from top to bottom.
Graphs and titles are all well and good, but to be useful a framework must produce guidance. An example outcome from the Space analytic framework is listed below. It narrows the focus of DARPA programs into efforts that have been vetted during the framework development.
Invest in new technologies to break the habit: 5
• Pursue technologies that sponsor commercial capabilities, responsiveness, and creativity
• Develop on-orbit servicing to leverage the sunk costs of existing and future
on-orbit hardware.
• Partner with non-traditional providers (commercial, academic, international) for hosted payloads and integrated services to deliver more robust, less expensive, capabilities directly to users.
• to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). DARPA took a prototype sensor and put it in the hands of a combatant commander to use while the groundwork was being laid to produce a more permanent sensor pod for future procurement. Warfighters got the benefit of, albeit, just a single sensor, but operational use vetted the technology for the ongoing system design. In the end, capability was brought to the war fighter sooner, and the end product refined.
DARPA purposefully and systematically takes on the challenges that face the US defense industry. Through a series of best practices outlined above, DARPA is developing lane-changing technologies that are relevant, advancing the state-of-the-art and getting them to the end user faster and cheaper. The entire acquisition community could benefit from DARPAs example.
Chapter 3 Examples: Changing Lanes
The preceding discussion outlined the methodology DARPA uses to achieve lane-changing results, but theory is nothing without practice. The following examples serve to validate their approach.
A Case For Lasers: HELLADS/ORCA/HALOE
Until recently, laser weapons were the stuff of science fiction. One doesn't have to be from the 24 th century to understand the benefits of a laser gun, but directed energy has many more advantages that span the spectrum of military operations. In the present threat environment, adversary kinetic weapons are reaching parity with American systems. Russian and Chinese missiles put our aircraft and ships at risk (Russian/Chinese missiles risk our ships aircraft n.d.), denying access to strategic regions of the world. Adversary electronic attack capabilities can also degrade or render useless many American radar and communications systems. Faster, longer range missiles and more robust electronic protection would merely feed an arms race, and hardly present a lane change. Lasers have unique characteristics that render useless the large investments America's adversaries have already spent to achieve this relative military parity.
Lasers by virtue are fast, the speed of light to be precise. No missile can outrun a laser. Laser kinetic effects can be achieved the instant the decision is made to do so. The problem has always been size, weight and power (SWAP).
The DARPA High Energy Liquid Laser Area Defense System (HELLADS)
program aims to achieve a 150 kiloWatt offensive and defensive weapon system, capable of being carried on a B-1 aircraft.
Figure 4: HELLADS concept drawing 6
The power and duty cycle are sized to provide tactically significant effects against a variety of air, ground, and missile type targets. The specific details are classified, but in a defensive role, such a system could significantly degrade multi-billion dollar Integrated Air Defense Networks (IADS) and anti-ship missile systems.
In an offensive role, such a laser could theoretically immobilize ground targets with no collateral damage or shoot down aircraft.
Not to mention that the HELLADS system is rechargeable, providing an (effectively) unlimited magazine. A viable laser's impact to military tactics and doctrine would be akin to the introduction of military aviation itself. Many R&D programs have tried and failed to achieve the practical-tactical laser holy grail. Programs such as the Airborne Laser (ABL), have had great successes as of late, but only the DARPA HELLADS program has made the practical problem of size, weight and power a program objective.
In a radio frequency (RF) jamming environment, a jamming-angle radar track would be sufficient to cue a laser, which could in turn disable the jammer. The effects could be achieved immediately, something that can't be done with missiles, especially those susceptible to jamming themselves. In an integrated sense, the HELLADS laser could serve to negate airborne electronic platforms, restoring radar system effectiveness.
Alternately, laser sensors are immune to existing RF electronic attack systems altogether. To jam a laser, a jammer would have to be in the path of the laser, and therefore vulnerable to attack. The DARPA High Altitude LIDAR Operations Experiment (HALOE) program built and fielded a laser radar (LIDAR) system that provided ultra-high resolution 3-D ground maps to war fighters engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom. The HALOE project is transitioning to a podded version for UAVs, and could be adapted to an air intercept application with modest additional investment. An airborne LIDAR sensor would provide precision greater than any existing radar system and be immune to all existing electronic attack systems. weather is a degrading factor, the system would perform no worse than existing radios (in the worst case), and limits the vulnerability to RF jamming to only those nodes that cannot acquire a laser link. Deliberate network design and tactics could be developed to overcome this apparent weakness.
Critics will inevitably point out the inherent limitations of lasers, but that misses the point. The strengths of laser technology serve to render useless billions of dollars worth of adversary investments. Weaknesses could be minimized by integrating with existing technologies, multiplying their strengths symbiotically. DARPA's holistic approach to investment in laser technology has opened up a broad spectrum of realistic choices for military acquisitions.
Changing lanes across the operational panorama not only degrades expensive adversary defense systems (without firing a shot), it provides unrivaled capability and freedom of maneuver.
A Step Back is a Step Forward: PINS/HiDRA
The Global Position System (GPS) revolutionized the way America approaches warfare, arguably, unlike any technology in its history. Precision guidance and navigation not only made the US more effective at prosecuting targets, achieving tactical and strategic effects at a lower cost (lives, equipment, collateral damage), but it changed the public's perception and expectations for military operations. The public has always expected the US military to succeed, but the advent of precision GPS weapons meant that it could attain the same military objectives without causing undue collateral damage.
Precision strike has always existed in the US arsenal in one form or another, but the low cost and availability of GPS systems has spread to all spectrums, changing the expectations for all forms of operations. Many technologies have contributed to reduction in collateral damage, but for the most part, they have all been underpinned by GPS precision guidance and navigation. Like many luxuries long enjoyed, this appetite for 'humane' warfare is here to stay. And so, America's adversaries have positioned themselves to deny GPS on the battlefield. Arguably, the main objective is not to deny America the ability to strike a target, but to deny the ability to strike it cleanly and surgically without undue collateral damage. Thus attacking America's critical center-of-gravity, public support.
Through the Precision Navigation and Timing (PNT) analytic framework, DARPA is investing in a suite of technologies focused on improving or at least maintaining GPS quality precision and universal availability. Most notably are the Precision Inertial Navigation Systems (PINS) High Dynamic Range Atom (HiDRA) and Micro Precision Navigation and Timing (Micro-PNT) programs.
Both attempt to mitigate GPS vulnerabilities by returning to physics based inertial navigation systems, which cannot be jammed or denied. The DARPA hard portion of these programs is to achieve GPS precision at a low cost, and make it available to every warfighter. Highly precise inertial navigation systems are nothing new, but have been prohibitively expensive for vast proliferation or disposable systems like weapons. PINS HiDRA uses atomic physics to achieve better than GPS precision for platforms like fighter jets, submarines, and some weapons; enabling unmolested operations in jamming environments and/or allowing submarines to stay submerged significantly longer. Micro-PNT developed a corn-kernel-sized inertial navigation sensor, enabling GPS precision in nearly any application imaginable.
Inertial navigation has always been superior to vulnerable beacon based systems like GPS, but material science lagged satellite advancements.
DARPA's portfolio investments in inertial navigation technologies will allow the US military to change lanes back into inertial navigation, weaning it from the stopgap GPS technology without compromising the capability it provided. The examples given here demonstrate that DARPA is using a systematic and comprehensive approach to solving the problems that face the defense industry. Through deliberate and focused investment, DARPA is advancing the state-of-the art in many technological areas and achieving significant and relevant effects across the full spectrum of warfare. Through continuous investment, it also fills transition gaps before they form.
Family of Long Range Precision
Chapter 4 Conclusion
For better or worse, the American way of war will most assuredly continue to rely on technology. The peace, freedom, and influence it enjoys will inevitably depend on its ability to maintain technological supremacy. This paper contends that the defense industry itself is a weapon system and/or core competency that the department of defense (DOD) must exercise and cultivate in order to maintain America's superpower status. The reality is, however, that potential adversaries and international rivals are encroaching on America's top spot, threatening its political freedom of maneuver. Declining budgets and national resources create a significant challenge for the DOD as it can no longer simply outspend an adversary. More striking is the disparity in R&D investments; potential adversaries are beginning to adopt the American way of war. In order to prevail, America must innovate and change lanes as it has done so many times in the past. But past performance does not guarantee future success, so deliberate action must be taken to maximize potential for success.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has a proven record of innovation, which is by no accident. Its deliberate policies, practices, and organization are as important as the brilliant minds within its walls. The entire DOD acquisition system should adapt a more DARPA-like attitude as adversaries get smarter and budgets get smaller. In determining future requirements, the DOD should accept more risk and demand more revolutionary advances over incremental change. Requirements must be developed such that capabilities change lanes to avoid the oncoming traffic, not simply bearing down to take absorb impact. The DOD should eliminate layers of bureaucracy that add no significant value, namely redundant headquarter staffs, and empower lower level decision makers to make significant change.
Similarly, decision makers must be selected based on expertise in the subject matter, not on archaic measures of promote-ability. The DOD should cultivate the defense industry, treating it more as a partner than as a merchant, and do so holistically, including performers at every level from requirements development to end user deployment. Lastly, the DOD acquisitions system must remain relevant to the warfighter. DARPA does this by deliberately steering investments to real needs and remaining flexible as the environment changes. Requirements creep is the bane of an acquisitions program, but DARPA's ability to react in meaningful ways turns requirements creep into relevant change.
